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-I.NTRODUCTION.
 
This paper is presented in order-to provide a concis.'
 
but accurate report on the present state 'of the development
 
of the grain management program (GMP) simulation model.
 
This model has been designed to become an integral component
 
of the larger Korean agricultural sector simulation (KASS)
 
By doing this, many of the inputs and the loading
model. 

effects for the GMP model are provided by the already existing
 
KASS model. Furthermore, a large number of criterion vari­
ables for evaluating the impacts of various grain management
 
programs are already present in the KASS model, e.g., farm
 
income, urban nutrition levels, etc.
 
The development of the GMP component has required
 
the design of two new subsector models: a government grain
 
management (GGM) subsector model and a private marketing
 
(PM) subs'ctor model. Although influenced by government
 
grain management operations, the PM model can operate indepen­
dently of the government grain-management model. For this
 
reason, the PM model need not be associated directly with
 
Rather, it can be viewed &s a refinement
the GMP component. 

to the KASS model necessary for incorporating the CMP
 
component. Other refinements to.,the existing KASS model
 
components were also necessary,
 
The farm production and urban demand components
 
have been rofined to reflect seasonal behavioral responses
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to changes in market,prices,, income.1, and-other factors. 
Market pricing dynamics and'transactions of controlled 
grains (rice and barley) have also been,internalized within 
the KASS model in order to reflect the results of alternative 
price. control policies and programs. 
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL'' 
componentThe general conceptualization of PtheGM 
model ts illustrated in Figure 1. It consists of four
 
subsector models and a market pricing and transaction
 
mechanism which provides the linkage between these subsector
 
models and the rest of the KASS model, i.e.,
 
* Government grain management subsector model
 
* Private marketing subsector moel
 
:Farm production subsector model
 
. Urban demand subsector model
 
* Market pricing and tr2n.-V.ction mechanism.
 
In this section, a 'brief nontechnical description 
will be given of each of the four subsector models along with 
the market pricing and transaction mechanism. The following 
sections of this paper will then deal in more detail with 
each model. 
Government Grain Management (GGM) Subsector Model-

The GGM subsector model is the instrument through
 
which researchers and decision makers can evaluate proposed
 
alternative grain management policies and programs. This
 
model calculates several variables directly related to
 
government grain management operations and also serves as
 
an interface between these activities and the rest of the
 
KASS model. Some of the types of policies which can be
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Figurb 1. Grain Management Program Simulation Model 
(General Outline) 
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,

addressed to the KASS model through thepreseit version of
 
the 	GGM model component are:
 
a) 	policies for controlled market pricing patterns.
 
b) 	 policies for government buying and selling 
pricing patterns 
c) 	policies (or decision rules) governing the
 
intensity and timing of goverment domestic
 
purchases and sales for controlling market prices
 
d) 	policies governing the desired seasonal levels
 
of reserve stocks of rice and barley
 
e) 	policies (or decision rules) governing the
 
intensity and timing of imports to maintain
 
desired stock levels, while at the same time
 
.utilizing these same stocks in controlling
 
market grain prices
 
f) policies related to the amount of government­
owned and government-leased warehousing
 
g) policies regarding warehouse construction and
 
financing
 
h) policies regarding import financing
 
i) policies specifying import quotas on.wheat and
 
feedgrains
 
j) policies imposing tariffs on wheat and feedgrains
 
The GGM subsector model is designed as an automatic
 
feedback control system. Currently, three automatic con­
trollers are incorporated into the model: a market price
 
controller, an import controller, and a warehousing controllex
 
Basically, each controller periodically compares the actual
 
observed values of the 'controlled' variables (e.g., rice
 
and barley prices) with the current desired values. The
 
time-series of differences between actual and desired values
 
arp called the "error sign.ls These error signals are
 
used to generate appropriate .corrective action tO reduce
 
the amount of error in the controlled yariables. In the
 
case of 'the price controller, the error signals are used
 
to generate government domestic purchasing and sales pattern'!
 
which would be necessary to maintain the desired market
 
price behavior. There are definite trade-offs between
 
system response (how market price actually responds to
 
desired price signals) and the costs and impacts of various
 
control schemes. These are system design problems which
 
must be worked out through interactions between researchers,
 
decision makers, and the KASS/GMP model.
 
Private Marketing (PM) Subsector Model
 
As depicted in Figure 1, the PM subsector model
 
Provides the pipeline between marketed farm production and
 
final urban demand (or consumption). When the government
 
is active in grain operations,, a portion of farm marketings
 
are acquisitioned through various programs based on the
 
established government purchasing price and stored (or used)
 
by the government. These stocks, augmented by imports,
 
are later released onto the free market at the established
 
government selling price through registered grain dealers.
 
The complexities of the actual private marketing
 
system in Korea are greatly simplified in the PM subsector
 
model. All private marketing channels and various levels
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)fmarketing activities are aggregated into one entity 
as the "private market." The PM subsector model " referred ,o 

:alculates several variables related to private market
 
inventory levels, warehousing,
grain activities, such as 

holding costs, and profits. Two very important variables
 
generated by the PM subsector model are private market
 
The time paths of these two variables
demands and marketings. 

describe the role which the private market is playing in 
domestic grain storage.
 
While government grain operations (buying, storing,
 
and selling) are motivated mainly by market price control
 
objectives, private marketing operations are motivated by
 
an altogether different objective--profit. The private
 
market will exercise whatever degrees of freedom are available
 
manner which will attempt to maximize
to it and behave in a 
its own expected profits. The PM subsector model gives much 
attention to price and profit speculation, since these 
projections have a definite influence on marketing behavior.
 
onSeveral factors have an effect private market 
profit speculation: warehousing costs, storage costs, in­
terest rates, and, of course, prices. Costs and interest 
rates do not tend to fluctuate throughout the profit specu­
lated period as do prices. For this reason, market pricing 
patterns (and the predictability of these patterns) have 
the most critical influence on seasonal PM behavior. A 
well-ccntrolled market price therefore can be used as.a
 
8"
 
connection (or contro-l ever) between the government grain 
management program and the private marketing system. 
Given
 
a well-behaved (-controlled) market price pattern which is
 
allowed to persist, the PM subsector can be motivated'by
 
normal piofits to take over much, if not the entire, task
 
of domestic grain storage, thus enabling the government to
 
gradually.reduce its grain operations for controlling prices.
 
Decision makers may wishto develop policies which
 
motivate farmers and urban consumers to take over (and benefit
 
from) part of the grain storage function. Farm credit,
 
interest rates, construction costs, and, again, pricing
 
patterns are some of the instruments through which these
 
objectives can be accomplished. Due to economies of scale,
 
however, it may be'desirable for the private market to takp
 
over most of the domestic storage function. These are policy
 
questions for decision makers and can be studied and eval­
uated by means of the KASS/GMP model.
 
Farm Production Subsector Model
 
The farm production subsector model provides several
 
criterion variables with which researchers and decision
 
makers can evaluate the iipact of various grain management
 
policies and programs on the Korean farmer. Variables
 
such as domestic production, seasonal farm consumption,
 
storage, marketings, and income are generated in this
 
subsector model. 
9
 
Market Pricing and Transaction Mechanism
 
Market grain prices (rice and barley) are generated
 
by this mechanism and move dynamically in response to aggregate
 
excess demand. Positive excess demand causes prices to rise,
 
excess supply) causes
while negative excess demand (i.e., 

Since producers and consumers in Korea
prices to fall. 

enjoy free market options of selling and buying through
 
government-controlled or private marketing channels, it has
 
been necessary to incorporate a transaction mechanism
 
within the KASS model to reflect the allocation of domestic
 
supply and demand between the private and government subsectors.
 
SGOVERNMBNTGRAIN MANAGBMENT SUBSECTOR'MOD. L 
An activity analysis of'the GGM subsector model 
is given in Figure 2. This analysis classifies each variable
 
of the GGM model as an input, parameter, or output/criterion,
 
It also gives a brief description, the mnemonic, and the
 
exact units of measurement for each variables Figure 2
 
will be useful to refer to when following the detailed
 
discussion of the GGM model structure below.
 
The system diagram in Figure 3 gives a concise
 
description of the structure of the GGM subsector model.
 
Every mathematical relationship discussed in the remainder
 
of this description of the GGM model is depicted in this
 
diagram.
 
btrucTurai uescription 
Automatic Control Mechanisms
 
The three automatic control mechanisms currently ,
 
incorporated within the GGM subsector model are depicted
 
in Figure 3. The first controller prescribes the level ani
 
timing of government domestic grain activities (buying or
 
selling rates) necessary to maintain desired market price
 
behavior. The secQnd controller prtscribes the level and
 
timing of government imports necessary to maintain desired
 
government grain reserve stock levels while, at the same
 
time, utilizing these reserve stocks for price control.
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The third controller prescribes warehousing activities 
(building or leasing) necessary-to reali ze desired ware­
housing-plans.
 
The design of each of these controllers will consist
 
of determining control functions (i.e., decision rules or
 
policies) which are feasible and satisfactory to grain
 
management pzogram decision makers and, at the same time,
 
cause desired system response.
 
Automatic Price Control Mechanism.
 
The automatic price controller for the GMP subsector
 
model is depicted in the upper left-hand corner of Figure 3.
 
The "error" observed between desired market price and actual
 
market price is given by
 
PERRi(t) =P~i (t) -Pi (t)(I 
where: 
PERRn controlled price error--W/MT
 
PD=,desired price,-W/MT
 
P =,actual price--W/MT
 
i a commodity index
 
t = time.
 
Since-the output of the controller is to be (a prescription
 
of) government domestic purchases and sales, we must first
 
normalize the price error signal to put it into the appropriate
 
units (i.e., MT/yr.). This is done as follows.
 
AERRi (t) DBMUAi*PBRRi (t)/PD t)(2 
where: 
ABRR "adjusted" error signal--MT/yr
 
average annual urban demand--MT/yr
DBMUA -
PERR = controlled price error signal--W/yr 
PD~ desired market price--W/yr 
general control scheme (proportional-plus-derivative"
 
is used for the automatic price?lus-integral control) 
says that three functions:ontroller design. This merely 
)f the adjusted error will influence the output of the 
itself, (2) its derivativecontroller: (1) the error 
the 	integral (or accumulation)
(rate of change), and (3) 
In Figure 3, the price controllerDf the error over time. 
is depicted as the following function: 
Gl, G2d + G3 dt 	 (3) 
G1 , G2, and G3 are the "gains" or weights given to each
 
of the functions of the controller.1-/ Furthermore, these
 
L' 	 Since DEMUA Ws used to normalize the pricing error signals, the
 
gains in the price controller specify the 'proportion of DEUA
 
per unit of each function.' In other words, the level of purchases
 
(or Liles) prescribed by the contxvller to correct a pricing 
error is represented by some proportion of DDIUA. Each function 
of the controller contributesto (or detracts from) this total 
proportion of DEMUA. GI representb the proportion of DEMUA 
per unit of error (PERR/PD)J G2 represents the proportion of 
per unit of change in error (i.e., the slope of the error),DEMUA 
per unit of accumulatedand G3 represents the proportion o., DEMUA 

error,
 
G's, are matrices.,,' o am 'ple' 
gil giz 
The diagonal elements (gill and gizz) are the direct pro­
portional gain parameters for rice and barley price errors,
 
respectively. The off-diagonal elements (g1 21 
and g12) 
are the compensating gain parameters which (if properly
 
specified) will prescribe activity (buying or selling)
 
which will cancel interactions between commodity prices.
 
Specifically, g11 2 is the gain parameter which prescribes
 
compensating activity in rice when correcting errors in
 
barley price, and g121 is the gain parameter which prescribes
 
compensating activity in barley when correcting errors in
 
rice price. Another name sometimes used for the controller
 
function (3) above is "series ,compensator."
 
Price? Control Activity Constraints
 
.The output of the controller,has been referredto 
Is "prescribed activity." Actual feasible activity will 
lepend.,on a number of logical factors: 
a) to buy, the government must have financial
 
resources available
 
b) to buy, the government must have storage space
 
available
 
c) to sell, the government must, of course, have
 
stocks available.
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The logic function depicted'in Figure 3 provides those:
 
constraints to government price control activities:.
 
Automatic Import Control Mechanism
 
The government must draw on its stocks when engaging
 
in price control activities. If it also desires to maintain
 
a reserve stock level, it must augment its stocks with imports.
 
The automatic import controller is nuch simpler than
 
error signal
the price controller described above. The 

consists of
 
BRRIi (t) * GINVDi Ct)-GINVi (t)-PIPINVi.(t) (S) 
Where: 
ERRI * controlled inventory error--n 
GINVD - desired government stock levels--MT 
GINV=n current government inventory--MT
 
PIPINV • imports on order which are not yet
 
delivered--MT.
 
The same general control scheme (proportional-plus-derivative­
plus-integral control) is used for the automatic import
 
controller. In Figure 3, the import controller is depicted
 
as the following function.
 
(6)
G4 +.Gs d + G6fdt 
G4, G5, and G6 are the gains or weights given each of the
 
functions of the controller. There are no coupling effects,
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therefore the G's in (6) are, at most, diagonalmatrices, 
It is very possible that the same gains can be used for all, 
controlled commodities, meaning that the G!s in (6),may 
simply be scalar parameters. 
Import Activity Constraint
 
Currently, the model does not allow exports. There
 
will be periods during the year when stock levels exceed
 
the desired reserve levels set by the government. If this
 
constraint was not in the model, exports would be triggered
 
every time stock levels exceeded the desired reserve levels.
 
This constraint is modeled as follows.
 
RIMPIi(t); w MAX(RIMPIi(t) ,0.) (7) 
wnerew 
RIMPI rate import orders are placed--MT/yr 
MAX (ab) - maximum function. 
Automatic Warehousing Control Mechanism
 
The government provides for the storager:bf controlled
 
grains through both leased and government-owned warehousing.
 
Given a warehousing plan, the automatic warehouse control
 
mechanism will prescribe the activities required to meet
 
this plan. These activities will consist of the rates (and
 
timing) at which government warehouse construction is started
 
and the rates (and timing) of government warehouse leasing.
 
Two error signals are measured by the warehousing
 
control mechanism: the error in total government-controlled
 
warehouse capacity (TCERR), and the error in government­
owned warehouse capacity (GCERR).
 
TCERR(t) * TCAPD(t)-GCAPL(t)-QWAD(t)-QWAL (t) (8) 
GCBRR (t) * GCAPD (t) QWAD (t) -QWUC (t) (9) 
where: 
TCERR - total warehouse capacity error--MT 
GCERR = government-owned warehouse capacity error--MT 
TCAPD - desired total capacity--MT 
GCAPD - desired government-owned capacity--MT 
GCAPL a government-leased capacity--MT 
QWAD = government-owned capacity--MT 
QWAL - current amount of capacity being acqui­
sitioned--MT 
QWUC government warehouse capacity under con­
struction- -MT 
Since there are two error signals involved, there,.are also
 
.two control functions. A proportional control. scheme is
 
used for each of the warehousing control functions.
 
Government Grain Management Operations
 
Domestic Buying and Selling
 
The 'prescribed' government demands and marketings 
are the output of the automatic price control mechanism
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discussed earlier. 
Given that logical conditions allow
 
for the prescribed price control activities, these signals
 
become actual government demands and/or marketings. The
 
transaction mechanism receives these signals aad returns
 
the actual resulting government domestic purchases and/or
 
sales.
 
Government Inventory Levels
 
Equation (10) expresses the dynamics of government
 
grain stock levels.
 
GINVi (t+DT)-GINV i (t)+DT*(GIMPi(t)+GPURi (t)	-GMKTS* t) 
-GSLOSgi(t)) (10) 
where:
 
uINV government stocks of commodity i--MT
1 

GIMP - government imports of commodity i--MT/yr 
GMKTS * government sales--MT/yr 
GPUR - government purchases--MT/yr 
GSLOSS - government storage losses--MT/yr;' 
DT - basic time increment used in the simulation. 
--.025 yr 
Government storage losses in Equation .(10) 'are+
 
computed as
 
GSLOSSitt) - STLOSS*GINVi(t) 	 (l.) 
where STLOSS is the proportion of storage lost or damaged
 
per year.
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Imports
 
The rate at which import ordeis are placed is the 
output of the import controller which was discussed earlier.
 
The model uses a distributed delay to simulate the
 
lags involved in processing import orders and transporting
 
grain to Korean ports and then to government warehouses.
 
This delay is simulated by a call to subroutine DELDT.
 
CALL DELDT (RIMPIi,GIMPiRINIMPi,DELIMPiIDTIMPDTKIMP) (12)
 
where:
 
RIMPI - rate at which orders are placed for imports 
--MT/yr 
GIMP - rate at which imports arrive at government 
warehouses--MT/yr 
RINIMP - an array of KIMP intermediate rates--MT/yr
 
DELIMP - importation delay--years (the average
 
elapsed time between ordering of imports
 
and arrival of grain at government ware­
houses)
 
IDTIMP - internal DELDT parameter 
KIMP - a parameter that determines the shape of
 
the probability distribution function for
 
the import delay (applies to individual
 
units of grain as they arrive at government
 
storage facilities)
 
DT * time increment used in the simulation--.025 yr 
The amount of grain which :has been ordered but not 
yet received is represented by the storage in this delay. 
22 
... CIMP 
.
-PIPINVi.(t)"= DLIMP *IDTIMP*1 RINIMPij.(t)/KMP 
Warehousing 
The warehouse leasing and construction order,rates
 
are the outputs of the warehousing controller which wa:
 
discussed earlier.
 
It is assumed that there is lag in acquisitioning
 
leased government warehouse capacity. This phenomenon is
 
simulated by a call to the DELDT subroutine.
 
CALL DBLDT.(RWALIRWALORINWAL,DBLWALIDTWALDTKWAL) (14)
 
where: 
RWALI - rate at which warehouse leasingv activities 
are begun--MT/yr 
RWALO - rate at which leased warehouse capacity 
is acquisitioned--MT/yr 
RINWAL - an array of KWAL intermediate rates--MT/yr 
DBLWAL - average length of leased warehouse ac­
quisition period--years
 
KWAL - parameter which determines the probabiliti

distribution of the acquisition period.
 
The storage in this delay (QWAL) represents the
 
amount of leased capacity currently in the process of being.
 
acquisitioned.
 
KWAL
 
QWAL(.t) = DELWAL*IDTWAL* RINIVALj(t)/KWAL (15)jul 
L-' Thio equation denotes the exact manner in which the storage in 
.a delay is calculated. This method is more precise than simply
integrating input rate minus output "rateas depicted in Figure 3. 
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The current amount of leased warehouse capacity
 
is calculated by the following equation.
 
GCAPL (t+DT) = GCAPL(t)+DT*RWALO(t) (16)
 
where:
 
GCAPL = government-leased warehouse.capac ty--MT
 
RWALO a see (14)--MT/yr
 
DT = time increment of model--.025 year
 
Government warehousing construction lag perintA
 
are simulated by another call to subroutine DELDT.
 
CALL DELDT (RWJCI ,RWUCORINWUC,DELWUC,IDTWUCDT,IWUC) .,.(17) 
where:
 
RWUCI * rate at which government warehousing

construction is ordered--MT/yr
 
RWUCO rate at which new government warehousing

construction is completed--MT/yr 
RINWUC = array of KWUC intermediate rates--MT/yr 
DELWUC = average construction lag time--year 
KWUC a parameter which determines probability 
distribution of construction lag times.
 
The storage in this delay (QWUC) represents the
 
amount of government warehouse capacity under construction,
 
K$UCQWUCi(t) = DELWUC*IDTWUC I RINWUCj(t)/KwUC (18) 
j=l 
A5 soon as government warehouse construction is 
completed, it can be used for storage. This new capacity
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also begins its depreciation period at this time. A non­
conservative delay (one in which storage is lost throughout
 
the delay period) is used to simulate the depreciation of
 
warehousing capacity. The reason for using this special
 
delay in this case is because not all warehouse capacity
 
remains for the purpose of grain storage throughout the
 
depreciation life. Fire and other losses may also occur
 
at any time during the depreciation period. This depreciationi
 
and loss phenomenon is simulated by a call to subroutine
 
DPLDTX."
 
CALL DELDTX (RWUCO,RWADOpRINWAD,LBAR ,DELWAD,IDTWAD.DT. KIVAD) (19 
where:
 
RWUCO - rate at which new government warehouse 
construction is completed--MT/yr 
'..RWADO - rate at which warehouse capacity is decreased­
due to normal depreciation--MT/yr 
RINWUC - an array of KWAD intermediate rates--MT/yr
 
LBAR - proportion of the amount of warehouse grain

storage capacity which is lost from causes
 
other than normal depreciation--%/yr
 
DBLWAD - average normal depreciation period--year
 
WAD = parameter which determines the probability
 
distribution of the depreciation period.
 
Th9 amount of current government-owned warehouse
 
capacity (QWAD) is equal to the storage in the above depre­
ciation delay. 
QWAD t) DELWAD*IDTWAD*'K= RINWADj (t)/,KWAD (20)
 
Financing and Accounting
 
Revenues
 
The major revenue flows in the GGM subsector are
 
from the purchases and sales of domestic grains.
 
GRBVi (t) - GSLS i (t)* (PSi (t)-ClO3i)-GPURi Ct)* (PBi (t)'+CO4i) (21), 
where:
 
,
 
GRBV - gross revenue flow (+ or -.) from domestic

grain activities--W/yr
 
GSLS = current government sales--MT/yr 
GPUR = current government purchases--MT/yr 
PB = government-established buying price--W/MT 
PS - government-established selling price--W/MI 
C103 = cost associated with selling--W/MT 
=
C104 cost associated with buying--W/MT
 
Net revenue flows from domestic purchases and-sales
 
are defined as
 
GNRBV i(t) GREV i (t)-CHI(t) (22)
 
where:
 
GNRBV - net revenue flow rrom aomestic grain ac­
tivities- -W/yr
 
GREV see (21) above--W/yr
 
CHI m cost of holding inventory--W/yr
 
computed in (35) below .
 
26
 
Import Financing
 
Import Loan Repayment
 
The model policy parameter PCTCSH the'describesb 
proportion of imports that are paid for on a,cash basis.
 
The _rate at which indebtedness is acquired is therefore:.
 
RGRI, Ct - GIMP' (t)* (I-PCTCSHi )*PWLD 4 (t) (23) 
where: 
RGRI = the rate at which new loans are acquired 
and "enter" a grace period--$/yr 
GIMP - rate at which imports arrive at their des. 
tination--MT/yr 
PCTCSH * proportion of GIMP. paid for in cash 
(a number between ero and one) 
PWLD . the world price of commodity i (delivered 
at a Korean port)--$/MT 
The grace period is simulated by a call to the 
'DBLDT subroutine: 
CALL DELDT (RGRIi,RGROiRINGRi,DBLGR, IDTGRDTKGR) (24), 
;where: 
RGRI - rate new loans enter a grace period--$/yr 
RGRO - rate loans leave the grace period and enter 
a repayment phase--$/yr 
RINGR = -n array of KGR intermediate rates--$/yr 
=KGR average length of grace period for loans--year
 
Grace period interest payments are calculated as
 
follows: 
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GRIPi (t) = GRINT*QGRi(t) -2S). 
where:
 
grace period interest payments--$/yr
GRIP = 
QGR = total value of loans in grace period--$ 
= grace period interest rate--%/yrGRINT 

At the expiration of the grace period, loansenter
 
the repayment phase. T'he loan repayment phase is simulated
 
by another call to the DELDT subroutine.
 
(26)
CALL DBLDT (RGRO i,.RPOi,RINRPi'DlLRP, IDTRPDTKRP) 

were: 
RGRO - see above--$/yr 
RRPO - rate at which principle is retired on import 
loans--$/yr 
DELRP a average length of loan -epayment phase--yr 
KRP a parameter which determines the probability 
distribution of individual loan payoff periods. 
In order to compute payments to principle and interest 
on outstanding loans, it is important to compute the total 
amount of unpaid principle which is in the process of repayment. 
This variable is the storage of the above delay. 
KRP 
TOPI i (t) = DELRP*!DTRP* IRINRPij(t)/KRP (27)j=1 
Civen TOPIi(t), the payments to principle and
 
interest, (PPAII), are computed as:
 
RINT*DELRP RINT*DELRP
 
PPAII i(t) - -RINT*TOPIi (t)e )/(l-e (28)
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where:
 
PPAII' 	 payment to principle and interest for 
outstanding loans in the repayment phase 
- - $/yr 
=
TOPI -total outstanding principle on import loans
 
RINT n interest rate during repayment period--%/y 
DBLRP =,length of the repayment period--year 
•- base of natural logarithms, 
Cash Payments for Imports
 
The foreign exchange deficit 'representing.cash
 
i-paymentsi for imports is computed as follows.
 
PORBXDi(t) * GIMPi(t)*PCTCSHi*PWLDi(t) 	 (29) 
wnere::
 
FORBXD - foreign exchange deficit for imports paid
 
in cash--$/yr 
GIMP - government imports of commodity i--MT/yr 
PCTCSH - proportion of GIMPi paid for in cash 
PWLD - world price of commodity i delivered to 
Korean ports--$/MT
 
Given FOREXDi, the won cost of imports paid for in cash is'
 
FOREXWi(t) - FOREXDi (t)*WOND 	 (30) 
where: 
FORXW * won value of foreign exchange deficit 
for cash payments on imports--W/yr 
FO:'-.XD * see above--$/yr 
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WOND a won/dollar exchange rate'--W/$
 
Warehouse Construction Financing
 
Defrayments on the principle and interest of government
 
warehouse construction costs are simulated in the same
 
manner as import loan repayments. The rate of indebtedness
 
for warehouse construction is given by
 
RWARPI(t) = CI06*RWUCI(t) (31)
 
where:
 
'RWARPI = rate of indebtedness'for new warehousing

construction being started--W/yr
 
C106 = average construction cost of new warehouse
 
capacity--W/MT
 
RWLCI = 
rate at which new warehouse construction
 
is started--MT/yr
 
The repayment period for warehouse construction
 
loans is simulated by a call to subroutine DBLDT.
 
CALL DELDT (RWARPI,RWARPO,RINWRP DBLWRP, IDTWRPDT,KWARP) ':(32)
 
where:
 
RWARPI - see above--W/yr 
R79ARPO = rate at which the principle on construction
 
loans is paid off--W/yr
 
RINWRP - array of KWARP Antermediate rates--W/yr 
DELWRP = average lenigth of construction loan re­
payment period--year
 
KWARP - parameter which determines the probability
 
distribution of the construction loan re­
payment period.
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The amount of unpaid principle on construction
 
loans (TOPW) is given by the storage in.the above delay
 
KWARP
 
TOPW(t) - DBLRP*IDT* RINiRPj/KWARP
 
RINT2*DELWRP RINT2*DELWRP
PPAIW(t) - RINT2*TOPW(t)*e 	 /Cl-e ) (34 
where: 
PPAIW - payment to principle and interest for 
outstanding warehouse construction loans 
--W/yr 
TOPW - total outstanding principle on warehouse 
construction loans--W
 
RINT2 - interest rate on construction loans--%/yr 
DELWRP = 	 average length of construction loan re­
payment period--year 
e - base 	of natural logarithms. 
Inventory Holding Costs
 
The costs of holding government inventory are 
compuzed 	as:
 
CHIi(t) * CI01*GINVi (t) 	 (35) 
where:
 
CHI a cost of holding inventory--W/yr 
C101 - average cost of holding inventory--W/MT-yr
 
GINV - current government inventory--MT 
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Warehouse Leasing Expenditures
 
Expenditures on government-leased .warehousingare
 
given by
 
(36)
CGLCAP(t) * C102*GCAPL(t) 
where:
 
CGLCAP = expenditure on government-leased ware­
housing--W/yr 
GCAPL = government-leased warehouse capacity--MT 
C102 * average cost of leased warehouse capacity 
~--W/MT -yr.
 
Accounting
 
Of course, a very important set of criterion
 
variables for evaltating the impacts of alternative grain
 
management policies or programs is grain management account
 
balances.
 
Commodity cash balances are calculated as follows:
 
(37)

'BALi(t+DT) w CBALi(t)+DT*GNRBV i (t) 

there:
 
CBAL * commodity account balances--W
 
GNRBV = net revenue flow from domestic grain
 
activities; see equation (22)--W/yr
 
DT a time increment for the model--.025 year
 
Further commodity specific accounting follows:
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GMCF (t) GNRBVi (t) -FOREXWi (t) .PPAII,.t)*WO. (8:] 
where: 
GMCF - commodity specific account-flow including
import financing--W/yr 
GNR3V * see above--W/yr 
FOREXW won value of foreign exchange deficit 
for cash payments on imports--W/yr 
PPAII - payment to principle and interest on import
loans- - $/yr 
WOND * won/dollar conversion rate--W/$ 
The above account flows are summed over commodities: 
TGMCF(t) a IGMCF i (t) (39) 
1 
The flow (+ or -) of funds in the grain management program
 
account balance is.given by the following equation.
 
RGMBAL (t) - TGMCF (t) +REVBOK (t) +OGREV (t) +SALVR*R DO (t) ­
CGLCAP(t)-PPAIW(t)-RINT3*ABS(GMBAL(t))-Cl05 (40) 
where: 
RGMBAL w rate at which grain management account 
balance is changing--W/yr 
TGMCF = account flow due to grain operations--W/yr 
RBVBOK a revenue transfers from BOK--W/yr 
(exogenous to model) 
OGREV - other revenue transfers--W/yr 
(exogenous to model) 
SALVR - salvage rate for government-owned warehousing 
--W/MT 
RWADO - rate at which government warehousing capacity

is decreased due to normal depreciation--MT/yr 
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expenditure on government-leased warehousing
CGLCAP 

.- W/yr 
payment to principle and interest on warehouse
PPAIW * 
construction loans--W/yr
 
RINT3 - account deficit/opportunity interest rate--%/yr
 
CIOS grain management administrative expenditure
 
--W/yr
 
IThe 'grainmanagement program balance (GMBAL) is calculated
 
.as follows:
 
41)
GMBAL(t+DT) - GMBAL(t)+DT*RGMBAL(t) 
PRIVATE' MARKETING, SUBSECTOR 
This section will give a brief description of the 
mathematical structure of the PM subsector model. Lacking 
in this account will be a technical description of the PM 
speculative behavioral mechanism. Such a description is 
provided in KASSIM Working Paper 73-1 and, because of its 
lengthiness, will not be repeated here. 
An activity analysis of the ordinary (i.e., without
 
speculative behavior) PM subsector model is given in Figure 4.
 
This analysis classifies; each variable of the PM model as
 
an input, parameter, or output/criterion. It also gives
 
a brief description, the mnemonic, and the exact units of
 
measure for each variable. The system diagram in Figure S 
gives a concise description of the mathematical structure 
of the ordinary PM subsector model. 
Structural Description 
Private Market Grain-Operations.
 
?iv Xnventory 
The dynamics of PM inventories are described by the.
 
following equation.
 
PINVi(t+DT) = PINVi(t)+ 
DT* (PPUR i (t)-PSLSi (t)-PSLOSSi*PINVi ct)) _(42) 
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where:
 
PI1W - PM inventory--MT
 
PPUR - PM purchases
 
PSLS a PM sales
 
PSLOSS PM storage loss rate--%/yr
 
DT - time increment--.025 yr
 
i - commodity index.
 
Aggregate PM grain stockpiles are calculated by the
 
following summation:
 
TPINV(t) - PIE~i(t) (43) 
Financing and Accounting
 
Revenues
 
The major revenue flows in the PM subsector:model, 
are from the purchases and sales of domestic grains.
 
PREVi Ct) " PSLSi (t)* (CPUi Ct)-C203i)-PPURi(t)* CPi Ct),+C204 i) (44) 
where: 
PREV - gross PM revenue flow (+ or -) Irom domestic 
grain activities--W/yr 
PSLS - current PM sales--MT/yr 
PPUR - current PM purchases--MT/yr 
CPU - urban consumer price--W/MT 
P n producer price--W/MT 
C203 - cost associated with buying--W/MT 
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C204 scost associated with selling--W/MT.
 
Total revenue flow (TPREV) from all commodities-'
 
handled by the PM subsector model is given by
 
TPREV(t) - PREV(t) 
-(45)
 
1 
Inventory Holding Costs 
The average-variable cost :of holding private grain
 
slocks is given by
 
AVCHPIi(t) - PINT *Pi(t)+G201i (46) 
where: 
AVCHPli(t) - average variable cost of holding
private stocks--W/MT-yr 
PINT =-PM ifterest rate--%/yr 
P * producer price--W/MT 
C201 - storage and handling cost--W/MT-yr 
The variable cost of holding PM inventory is given by 
VCHPIi(t) " AVCHPIi(t)*PINVi(t) (47) 
macero;
 
VCHPI - variable cost- of holding PM inventor)
--w/yr
 
AVCHPI - see above--W/MT-yr 
PINV - private inventory level--Mr. 
The fixed cost of maintaining present PM storage 
capacity is given by 
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FCHPI(t) " C202*PCAP(t) (48) 
where: 
FCHPI = total fixed cost of maintaining current 
PM storage capacity--W/yr 
C202 - average fixed cost of PM storage capacity 
-- W/MT-yr 
PCAP - current PK storage capacity--MT. 
In order to preserve commodity specific calculations, this 
fixed cost of PM capacity is charged proportionately to 
each commodity.
 
FCHPICi Ct) -, '(PINVi(t)/TPINV(t))*PCHPI (t) (49) 
where: 
PCHPIC =-commbdity specific fixed-cost of maintaining 
current PM storage capacity--W/yr
 
PIN' = current PM inventory level--MT 
(of commodity i) 
TPINV = total PM stockpile of grains--MT 
FCHPI s above--W/yr.ee 
Finally, the total cost associated with holding a
 
certain level of PM stocks consists of the variable cost of
 
holding this amount plus the fixed cost.
 
TCHPIi(t) VCHPI i (t)+FCHPICi ( t) . (0) 
where: 
TCHPI * tot-I cost of holding PM inventory--li/yr 
VCHPI - variable cost--W/y-7 
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PCHPIC, fixed, cit-w_/Yr. 
Profit 
Current P1profits are calculated as follows.:
 
(51)
P4Pi(t) * PREVi(t)-TCHPIi(t) 
where: 
w current PM profit--W/yrPM 

-)PREV current PM gross revenue flow (+ or from
 
domestic grain activities--W/yr
 
TCHPI'n total cost of holding PM inventory--W/yr.
 
Important performance criteria for the PM subsector
 
.moelare the accumulated (or annual) profits.
 
•(52) APMPi (t+DT) " APMPi (t)+DT*PMPi (t) 
where: 
APMP m accumulated (or annual) profit--W 
DT w time increment--.02S yr 
PMP ! current profit--W/yr. 
Total PM profit across all commodities (TPMP) is given by
 
3)TPMP,(t) - C~it). 

Private Market SpeculativeBehavioral Mechanism
 
serve
The PM speculative behavioral mechanism will 

as the nerve center for the PM subsector component of the
 
GMP model. It is through this mechanism that the PM subsector
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model will sense the impacts of:various grain management
 
policies and respond to new profit opportunities. Decisions
 
regarding the amount and timing of purchases and sales of
 
foodgrain will come from this mechanism. Priority decisions
 
which determine how available storage capacity will be al­
located among competing commodities will be made here.
 
Decisions which will determine the growth or decline of total
 
storage capacity will alr3 be made. All decisions (except
 
those reflecting government decrees) are made with one
 
objective: to maximize PM subsector profits. Whether
 
these decisions do maximize profits or even assure the
 
survival of the PM subsector will depend on several things:
 
(1) how accurate market speculators (modeled) are in pro­
jecting future market information; (2) how "predictable"
 
future market information actually is; and (3) the degree
 
to which PM speculators are restrained from engaging in
 
profit maximizing activities.
 
PARM PRODUCTION AND URBAN DEMAND
 
SUBSECTOR MODELS
 
In order to effectively interface the GMP component
 
model with the existing KASS model, some refinements and
 
modifications were necessary in the existing farm production
 
component and the urban demand component. These components
 
are described in Appendix A of the KASS report and again in
 
the User's Manual (Special Report No. 9). With the refinements
 
described below, these two KASS model components serve as
 
the required farm production and urban demand subsector
 
models of the GMP component.
 
Structural Description
 
Dr. Moon, Pal Yong, of the Korean Development Insti­
tute, has been investigating some of the seasonal foodgrain
 
demands and marketings in Korea.! / A review of the econo­
metric model used in Dr. Moon's study indicated that, with
 
some minor adjustments and "re-assumptions," it could be
 
fully incorporated into the KASS model. Although the model
 
was not originally developed for prediction purposes, it
 
seems capable of generating credible seasonal responses for
 
farm consumption, farm marketings, and urban demand. This
 
capability is precisely what is required from the farm
 
production and urban demand subsector models of the GMP
 
. Moon, Pal Yonq, An Econometric Analysis of Foodgrain Demnan and 
Marketings; Partial Vs. Total Response Analysis, Korean Devtio oent 
Institute, Seoul, 1972. 
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component. Of course, independent research into these 
response patterns will be undertaken to verify the.appli­
cability of the Moon model in this context.
 
Dr. Moon's model consists of eight simultaneous
 
equations: six behavioral equations and two market-clearing
 
identities. The six behavioral equations describe the
 
seasonal farm demand, farm sales, and urban consumption
 
demand for rice and barley in Korea. The two market­
clearing identities were included to complete the above 
system. Since TSLS was used to estimate the above coef­
ficients, the market identities have no effect on the 
estimation of the six behavioral equations. 
If we replace the two stauic market equilibrium 
identities in the hbove system by the (yet-to-be-described) 
dynamic relationships between prices and excess demands, 
the above model is transformed from a static system of 
simultaneous equations into a dynamic system of recursive 
equations. 
Moon's system of seasonal response equations is 
given on the following page. Notice that in the farm sales 
and urban demand equations, prices are the only endogenous 
variables a-rearing on the right-hand side. If,in the 
KASSIM model, prices at time t are calculated based on pricg 
and excess demands at time t-DT, we have, by definition, 
a reduced form for endogenous prices at time t. The values 
of prices at time t can then be used in the farm sales and 
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urban demaid at time't. Finally, values of prices and farm 
sales at time t can be used in the farm demand equations 
to obtain a reduced form for farm demand at time t. 
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Moon's Seasonal Response Model 
(Farm Demand) 
FD 
qR=blo + b, P +b .D P + b D P +b P +bP 
D+ bl (54)"+b26qt + b7(p%+ PBq + yl ) + 1 D2 
FK FS FS ($ 
FD 
q +bP- + P+bDP + b P +bP 
+ 	 +25B 	 20 + b1PR + b22DB b333B 24R 
S+ b b 7 (PRq 1+ BFS+ I= -) b 8D+1 b D 
(~S)PlC 	 FS-
(Parm salee) 
FSF b+ b B B L 128,. B 3+ 2~pR +%pP+b +bq -bo + bP D+ bD 

R 3031PR + 32R 33 2R 34 t-l 35 
D(56)
1K + ( 	 K + 
+ 36%~t-I 37 if-+ qt1+YNRB 301 392 
b2D P+b43DPB +b 44Lt- + b5E B-	b4 +3b P+K 1B( , FK 	 (57) 
+ q +b q q-I + + 1 + b4D 
(Urban Demand) 
UD 
-b 	+ bP3? +b DP + bDP+ bP1+ b P 534
50 SR 52 1 R 	 W (58) 
+ b56PRyU + b57YU + b58D1 + b59D2 
DjB VDP
qB 
UD 
bo + btPB + b D + b6 Pw 
+ b6	 ..60 +6B6 
+b66PBXU + b67YU +68D3 b6 9D3 
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Variable Definitions for Moons odel / 
Endogenous Variables: 
qD m farm per capita consmption of rice -kg#.mo 
FD q kcg/#-mo

BD - ""bitley,- /#-no
 
qF farm per capita sales of rice - kg/#-mo
 
R
 
FS
 
q " " " barl- - kg/#-Mo
 
qUD = urban per capita consumption of rice - kg/#-mo
 
R
 
BUD W , , bre - kW#-Uo 
P = monthly average wholesale price of rice deflated by the
 
R index of nongrain wholesale prices WPI n - W/kg
 
P - monthly average wholesale price of barley deflated by

B WPIn- W/kg
 
Ekxoenous Variables: 
P monthly average wholesale price of wheat flour deflated by

W WPIn - W/22 kg (bag)
 
.FK 
q farm per capita stock of rice at end of previous

Rt-l month - kg/#
 
FK 
q - farm per capita stock of barley at end of previous
 
Bt-l month - kg/#
 
YN farm per capita income originating from non-rice-barl 
sovrces deflated by index of prices paid by farmers
 
(PPFI) - W/l#-mo
 
T/
he original coefficients of Moon's modeZ have been transformel 
so that KASS units of measure can be used. The units indicated 
here are the original units. 
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Var5ab). Definitions (cont Id) 
-6 w-.. previousLt 1 - farm per capita jiaDo1j.es dB uL Lo o,,i 
month deflated by PPFI - W/# 
E - farm per capita cash expenditures for clothing, education, $etc.,-deflated by PPFI -. W/#-mo. 
- urban per capita disposable income deflated by the index 
of urban consumer prices - W/#-mo 
D - 1 if October - January period1 0 otherwise 
D2 if February - May period2 -0 otherwise 
D -1 if June - September period 
3 0 otherwise 
MARKET PRICING AND TRANSACTION MECHANISM4 
Market Pricing Dynamics 
Market price responses of controlled grains (cur­
rently rice and barley) have been internalized within the
 
KASS model. These prices serve as an important linkage
 
for interaction among the four subsector models of the GMP
 
component. (Market prices cause responses in the behavioral
 
patterns of each subsector, and, at the same time, the
 
behavioral patterns of each subsector cause responses in
 
market prices.)
 
The pricing mechanism currently being tested for
 
'application in the KASS model generates wholesale market
 
prices as a function of excess demand.
 
WPi(t+DT) - WPiCt)+DT*Ci*WPi(t)*(TDi(t)-TMi(t))/TDiCt) (60) 
where: 
W wholesale market price--W/MT 
DT0 time increrent of the KASS model--.025 yr 
C a an empirically determined parameter which 
describes the speed at which wholesale prices
 
respond to excess demands--no units 
TD - total aggregate demand (per DT)--MT 
TM n total aggregate (and residual) marketings 
--MT 
Th. total aggregate demand in (60) is defined as 
(61)TDj(t) n (PDEMi(t)+GDEMi(t)+UDEMi(t))*DT 
where: 
PDAI * private market subsector demand--MT/yr, 
GDEM a government subsector demand--MT/yr 
UDEM - urban subsector demand--MT/yr. 
The total aggregate (and residual) marketings are 
calculated according to Equation (62) below. The 'residuals'
 
in this*equation are defined as all past marketings which
 
have not yet cleared the market. These residuals are com­
puted by the transaction mechanism to be discussed shortly.
 
TMi(t) -.FMRESi Ct)+PMRBSi Ct) +GMRESi Ct) (62) 
where: 
TM - total aggregate (and residual) markets--MT 
FMRES - farm marketing residuals--MT 
see (65) below 
PMRES a private marketing residuals--MT
 
see (66) below
 
GMRES - government marketing residuals--MT
 
see (67) below 
Producer and consumer prices are derived from the
 
wholesale price of Equation (60) by the following trans­
formations.
 
P i(t) (1/ (l+ MMi))*WPi(t) (64, MMWi* 
cP~i~t) - CC+M i)/CI+MMWi*MMi))* iW (64 
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where:
 
P- *producer price--W/MT
 
CPU: consumer price--W/MT
 
WP - wholesale price--W/MT
 
MM n producer-to-consumer marketing margin--%
 
MMW - proportion of MM taken by producer-to­
wholesaler margin--% 
Transaction Mechanism 
Since the GMP model is separable into four entities
 
'(government, farmers, private market, and urban consumers), 
it is desirable to maintain as much information about the 
activities of each of these individual entities (or sub-
Ssectors) as possible. The allocation of domestic supply
 
,and demand among the subsectors has a very important impact 
on'the performance of each subsector model. 
Marketing Residuals 
It is assumed that marketings are not reversible
 
processes; once a certain amount of grain is marketed, it 
will remain on the market until purchased. When market 
demand (per unit time) for the grain exceeds the amount 
on the market, there will be no rsidual. However, when tha 
reverse is true and there are excess marketings (over 
demand) for a given time period, the residuals accumulate 
on the market and are added to marketings of subsequent
 
51
 
periods. This phenomenon is modeled for the farm, private,
 
and government subsectors as follows.
 
FMRES(t+DT) = FMRES(t)+DT* (FMKTS(t)-FSLS(t)) (65)
 
PMRBS(t+DT) = PMRES(t)+DT* (PMKTS(t)-PSLS(t)) (66)
 
(67)
GMRBS(t+DT) * GMRS(t)+DT* (GMKTS(t) -GSLS(t)) 
where:
 
FMRES
 
PMRBS - market residual supplies of respective 
GMRES subsectors--MT 
F1.5KTS 
PMKTS = current marketing rates of respective 
GMKTS subsectors--MT/yr 
FSLS
 
PSLS current sales rates of respective sub-

GSLS sectors--MT/yr
 
Market Transactions
 
The calculation of market transactions begins with
 
the following two purchasing equations.
 
(68)
PPURi(t) = MIN(PDEMi(t)1CMPi*PRFMi*FMRSi(t/J)Tl 
GPURi (t) - MIN (GDEMi(t),(1-CMP,*PRFMi)*FMRBEi(t)/DT) (69 
where:
 
PPUR - private marketing purchases--MT/yr
 
GPUR - government purchases--MT/yr
 
MIN(a,b) - minimum funtction
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PDHM 	 private market demand--MT/yr
 
GD3M -	 government demand--MT/yr 
PRFMI/-	 an empirical parameter reflecting tie 
natural proportion in which farm marketings 
are distributed between private and govern­
ment marketing channels--no units
 
CMp2-!= 	a government 'countermeasure' policy parameter
 
affecting the natural proportion of private/
 
government marketing--no units
 
FMRES - farm marketing residual (including current 
marketing) - -MT 
DT - time increment of the model--.025 year 
After completing these initial purchasing trans­
a'ctions, a check is made to see if any excess market demands
 
exist, 	and if there is a potential for a secondary trans­
action 	during the same time period.
 
BPDi (t) 	= PDE4i (t)-PPURi(t) (70 
EGDi(t) 	" GDM(t)-GPURi(t) (7 
where:
 
EPD, excess private market demand--MT/yr
 
EGD a excess government market demand--MT/yr
 
/ ~The parcweter PRFM may be computed as an empirical function
 
of a number of factors affecting farm choices of markets. These
 
might bo relative differences between ,goverrment-established
 
Luying lrice and market prices, the relative evels of market
 
activities (e.g., sizes of demands) of the government private
 
subco,+itcs, etc.
 
Currently, the parameter CMP in the purchasing equations above 
is set equal to 1. That is, no goverrmenv 'countermeasure' 
poZiciea are in effect which will change the propensity of Korean 
farmers to react in their choices of markets. 
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Pour possible situations exist;
 
Excess Demand From Possible 
' -Secondary 
Situation Private Market? Government Market? Transaction? 
1 Yes Yes No 
2 No No No 
3 Yes No Yes 
4 No Yes Yes 
In the first two situations, there vxi nu yvUential 
for a secondary transaction. However, in the last two situ­
ations, the chance of a secondary transaction does exist. 
Situation (3): 
Si" In this case, there is an excess demand in the 
private market and, most likely, a farm marketing residual 
on the government market. If it is assumed that residual 
farmY.vrketings may flow from the government to the private 
subsector, a secondary transaction can now take place in the 
same time period. Private purchases aro augmcatod by this 
second transaction: 
PPURi(t) * PPUR.(t)+ (t) '(72),MIN (DP i (t),FMRES i (t)/DT-PPURi ()-GPORi 
Situation (4):
 
In this case, there is an excess demand in the gov­
ernment market channel and, most likely, a farm mirkcting 
residual in the private market. If a secondary transaction 
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is allowed,. government purchases will, be augmented by the 
following equation: 
GPURi (t) " GPUR.(t) + 
1 MIN ( GDi (t), FMRBS i (t)/DT-PPURi (t) -GPUR i (t)) (73) 
Farm Sales are defined as 
FsLS 1,(t) GPURi (t) +PPURi (t) 	 74) 
The calculation of other sales transactions,'begins 
with the following two equations: 
PSLS i ( t) - MIN(PMRBSi (t)/DTPRUDi*UDEM) 	 (75) 
GSLSi (t) - MIN (GMRAHSi (t)/DT, (1-PRUDi (t))*UP)F) 	 (76) 
where: 
PSLS a private subsector sales--MT/yr 
GSLS - government subsector sales--MT/yr 
MIN(ab) = minimum function 
PMRES - private marketing residual supply--MT 
GMRBS - government marketing residual supply--MT 
-PRUDI / an empirical parameter reflecting the 
natural proportion in which urban demand 
is distributed between private and gov­
ernment marketing outlets
 
1-	 This parameter may be computed as an empirical function of a 
number of factors affecting the consumer's choice of markets. 
Those factors might be relative differences between government­
established selling prices and prevailing market consumer prices, 
the relative level of marketing activities, etc. 
A govorment oountermeasure parameter similar to CMP in the 
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UDEM * current urban demand--MT/yr 
After completing these initial sales transactions,
 
a check is made to see if any excess urban demand remains,
 
and if there is the possibility of any secondary transactions
 
during the same time period.
 
EUDPi(t.) - PRUDi*UDEMi (t)-PSLSi(t) (77) 
EUDGi (t) - (1.-PRUDi)*UDEMi(t)-GSLSi(t) (78)
 
where:
 
EUDP m excess urban demand in-private subsector
 
--MT/yr
 
EUDG - excess urban demand on government subsector 
--MT/yr 
PRUD - see above--no units
 
UDE n urban demand--MT/yr
 
PSLS - private sales resulting from first trans­
action calculation--MT/yr 
GSLS - government sales resulting from first
 
transaction calculation--MT/yr
 
Again, as in the case of farm-to-market transactions,
 
four possible transactions exist:
 
purohaoii-j equations discussed earlier can be incorporated into (75) 
and (76). This parameter would reflect goverment countermeasure 
pol,'cie such as taxations, or publicity campaigns which changel 
the propensity of urban concumers to react in their choices of 
markets. This parameter, would affect the market choices of 
oontumerD, but not the total amount of urban demand. If the 
Zatter type of parameter is desired in the model, it should be 
inoorporatedinto the urban demand component and not in the 
traneactionmechanism. %ch a parameter could be used to reflect 
govmwnnent policies to eupress urban consumption of certain 
oommoditieo (e.g., riceleas days, etc.). 
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Excess Urban Demand on Possible 
Secondary 
Situation Private Market? Government Market? Transaction? 
1 Yes Yes No 
2 No No No. 
3 Yes No •Yes 
4 No Yes es 
Situation (3):
 
In this case, there is an exces4 urban demand on
 
the private market, and, most likely, a government marketing
 
residue on the consumer market. If it is assumed that
 
consumers will shift their fxcess demands between markets
 
(in tle absence of adeqrate supply), a secondary transaction
 
can now take place in the same time period. Government
 
sales are augmented by this secondary transaction.
 
GSLSJ(t) - GSLS(t)+MIN (GMRBSi(t)/DT-G SLS i(t)pEUDPi(t)) (79) 
Situation (4):
 
In this case, there is an urban demand on the
 
government market, and, most likely, a private marketing
 
residual on the consumer market. If a secondary transaction
 
is allowed, private market sales will be augmented by the
 
following equation: 
PSLSi(t) - PSLSi(t)+ (0t4IN (PMRESi (t)/DT-PSLSi (t),EUDG i(t)) 

